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I INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner and Appellant, Dan Rodney Joos ("DAN") replies to the Respondent Piper 
C. Joos's (Monte) ("PIPER") Appellee's Brief as follows. In an effort to identify Piper's 
argument to which he is responding, Dan has generally used Piper's § designations and f 
numbers. Paragraphs*which do not contain new material to which a response is required 
have been omitted. 
II. REPLY TO SECTION IV OF PIPER'S RESPONSE 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Troxelv. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,120 S. Ct. 2054,147 L.Ed2d 49 (2000), changed 
the law. Dan's declaratoryjudgment lawsuit sought a determination that Utah's divorce laws 
were rendered unconstitutional by Troxel, supra. It was dismissed on summary judgment 
by Judge Medley, who also imposed URCP 11 sanctions against Dan because the Court 
concluded [R. 238-243] that his claims were allegedly res judicata as a result of this Court's 
11/4/99 decision [App. A-1 to Piper's brief], and his unsuccessful petitions for writs of 
certiorari. Dan argued that the intervening decision in Troxel supra., changed the law and 
thus avoided issue preclusion which otherwise might have prevented him for re-litigating that 
issue.1 
1
 See discussion in § VII, Issue I Res Judicata, P. 41 in Dan's opening brief. 
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Appeal Includes Summary Judgment Order 
2. Dan's appeal from the "entire judgment" included the summary judgment 
order. Piper's attempts to limit the scope of Dan's appeal [pp. 8 & 16] are misplaced. The 
Notice of Appeal in this case also included the following general statement as to the scope 
of the appeal, which is sufficiently broad to preserve the issues argued by Dan in his opening 
brief. Although not identified by date, the only "judgment" in this case is the Court 10/15/01 
Order re the 7/30/01 hearing. Dan's Notice of Appeal [R. 265] included the following 
statement as to the scope of Dan's appeal: 
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment 
(Emphasis added). 
3. Dan's notice of appeal followed URAP and is adequate. Paragraph 2a in the 
Notice of Appeal in the URCP, Form 1 suggests that exact wording. The fact that Dan also 
identified the order denying his URCP 59 motion does not limit the scope of the issues 
involved in this appeal. Contrary to Piper's argument [pp. 5 & 16], the "entire judgment" 
herein, including the Court's 10/15/01 Order concerning the 7/30/01 hearing, is properly 
before the Court for purposes of this appeal. 
URCP 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
4. Dan's URCP 59(e) motion included issues involved in the underlying summary 
judgment. Dan filed his URCP 59(e) motion pro se. Although not a model of legal 
draftsmanship, Dan's URCP 59(e) Motion included essentially all of the underlying claims 
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raised by Dan in this appeal, including such things as whether Utah divorce laws are rendered 
unconstitutional by Troxel, supra, whether URCP 11 sanctions were justified, etc. An 
appellant need not raise issue more than once at the trial court level to preserve them for an 
appeal.2 In \ 10 of its 11/14/01 Findings [R. 254-260], the Court specifically adopted its 
10/15/01 Order re the 7/30/01 hearing, *so an appeal from that Order includes an appeal from 
the 10/15/01 Order mentioned therein. Further, the Docketing Statement, which 
supplemented the Notice of Appeal, also set forth in detail the issues involved in the appeal. 
Piper could not have been misled as to the issues involved in this appeal. Even if the issues 
on appeal were limited to denial of Dan's URCP 59(e) Motion (which we deny), Dan's 
URCP 59(3) motion was sufficiently broad to include all of the issues raised by Dan on 
appeal. Notices of Appeal are to be liberally construed.3 
III. REPLY TO SECTION VI OF PIPER'S RESPONSE 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
5. Dan's action sought declaration that parental constitutional rights defined in 
Troxelj supra are binding on Utah divorce courts. Dan reaffirms the Statement of Facts 
in his opening brief [P. 17-20]. Dan denies Piper's claim, that he is attempting to re-litigate 
the divorce action. Instead, his declaratory judgement lawsuit sought a ruling that the 
intervening decision in Troxel, supra changed the law, avoided the issue preclusion which 
2
 Bookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968, f 14-15 (Utah 2002). 
3
 Roberson v. Draney, 182 P. 212, 213 (1919); State ex relB. B., 45 P.2d 527, ^  
10; U.K.P.C., Inc. v. R. O. A. Gen., Inc., 990 P.2d 945 (Ut App. 1999). 
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would otherwise have resulted from this Court's 11/4/99 decision [App. A-l to Piper's brief], 
which allowed him to litigate the new issue as to the effect of Troxel, supra, on the 
constitutionality of Utah's divorce laws. The events in the Utah Courts cited by Piper in 
support of her res judicata argument, all occurred in 1997, 1998 and 1999. But for the 
intervening U. S. Supreme Court's Troxel v. Granville decision in 20004 and the 2001 
decision in Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 1005 (2001) Piper's res judicata arguments5 
and Judge Medley's decision might have merit and Dan's Declaratory Judgment action might 
be barred by issue preclusion. Dan acknowledges that in its 11/4/99 unpublished 
Memorandum Decision [which has little or no precedential effect]6 this court held that Utah's 
divorce laws are constitutional. That decision also mentioned Res judicata .7 However, as 
"Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000). 
5
 See discussion in §VI, 11, P. 41 entitled "Res Judicata does not apply", of Dan's 
Opening Brief. 
6
 Rule 4-508. Unpublished opinions. Rule 4-508 reads in relevant part as follows: 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform standard for the use of unpublished opinions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential value and shall 
not be cited or used in the courts of this state, except for purposes of applying the 
doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 
(3) For the purposes of this rule, any memorandum decision, per curiam opinion, or 
other disposition of the Court designated "not for official publication'1 shall be regarded 
as an unpublished opinion. (Emphasis added). 
7
 A copy of this Court's 11/4/99 Memorandum Decision is in Piper's Addendum. 
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discussed in Dan's Opening Brief,8 the Troxel, supra decision changed the law and 
extinguished Piper's issue preclusion {res judicata) argument. Piper's argument seems to be 
that Dan's petitions to the U. S. Supreme Court seeking a writ of certiorari somehow had a 
res judicata effect. That argument is erroneous. See discussion in \ 6 below. 
6. Denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari has no res judicata effect. The 
essence of Piper's argument appears to be that Dan's unsuccessful petitions for writs of 
certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court and to the United States Supreme Court had res judicata 
affect lacks merit. Denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari is not a ruling on the merits and 
it does not have any res judicata effect.9 
7. Parental constitutional rights defined in Troxel, supra, apply to Utah divorces. 
Piper's attempts to narrowly limit the effect of Troxel, supra are not supported by the 
holdings in Troxel, supra or in later cases which have relied on Troxel, supra. For example, 
8
 See discussions in | A, B, C, P. 1-2; f 1-3, P. 15-16; f 2, P. 17; % 1-2, P. 20-22; 
§ VI, P. 24-29, in Dan's Opening Brief. 
9 
See discussion in 12(e), P. 4-5 of Piper's Brief. United States v Carver (1923) 260 US 482, 
67 L Ed 361, 43 S Ct 181; Maryland v Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. (1950) 338 US 912, 94 
L Ed 562, 70 S Ct 252; Polites v United States (1960) 364 US 426, 5 L Ed 2d 173, 81 S Ct 
202; league v Lane (1989) 489 US 288, 103 L Ed 2d 334, 109 S Ct 1060, reh den 490 US 
1031, 104LEd2d206, 109 SCt 1771; Yee vEscondido (1992, US) 118LEd2dl53, 112 
S Ct 1522. Hopfmann v Connolly (1985) 471 US 459, 85 L Ed 2d 469,105 S Ct2106; denial 
of certiorari imported no expression of opinion upon merits of case, and opinions 
accompanying denial of certiorari could not have same effect as decisions on merits, Teague 
v Lane (1989) 489 US 288, 103 L Ed 2d 334, 109 S Ct 1060, reh den 490 US 1031, 104 L 
Ed 2d 206, 109 S Ct 1771 [Per Justice O'Connor, with the Chief Justice and two Justices 
concurring, and three Justices concurring in part and concurring in judgment]. 
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in State ex rel S.A.,10 a case involving "a sibling at risk" case, this Court expanded the 
holding in Troxel, supra, well beyond third-party visitation situations to which Piper attempts 
to limit the Troxel, supra decision.11 Among other things, this Court held that the Troxel, 
supra decision established a constitutional right of parents to the care, custody and control 
of their children and to due process concerning those rights. At P. 1168, If 5 of its decision 
in State ex rel S. A., supra, this Court cited Troxel, supra as follows: 
The liberty interest at issued in this case-the interest of parents in the 
care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of 
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. 
(Emphasis added). 
8. Whether the decision in Troxel, supra binds Utah Divorce Courts has not been 
ruled upon by the Utah Appellate Courts. The Utah Appellant Courts have not ruled as 
to the effect ofTroxel, supra on the constitutionality of Utah's divorce laws. Dan had a right 
to ask them to do so. Judge Medley erred when he imposed sanctions upon Dan, a pro se 
litigant, for asking the Utah Courts to rule on that constitutional issue. Judge Medley's 
conclusion that Dan's declaratory judgment lawsuit was barred by res judicata12 was in error 
because Troxel, supra, was decided after Dan's prior appeals.13 If as argued by 
10
 State ex relS.A., 37 P.3d 1166, \ 5 (Ut Ct. App. 2001). 
11
 State ex rel SA.} 37 P3d 1166 at H 4 (Ut. Ct. App. 2001) and quotation therefrom 
found on page 18 of Dan's Opening Brief herein. 
12
 Tf 1, P. 4 of Judge Medley's 10/15/01 Conclusions of Law re summary judgment 
motion [R. 238-243]. 
13 
The chronology of relevant events in this matter is as follows [Dan's unsuccessful petition's 
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for writs of certiorari to the Utah and U.S. Supreme Courts are omitted because, as discussed 
in f 6, P. 5 above, denial of a writ of certiorari has no precedential effect] : 
11/7/96 Divorce decree entered. 
9/25/97 In case #960720CA the Ut. Ct. App. affirmed the divorce 
decree. 
11/4/99 In case #990666CA the Ut. Ct. App. affirmed the lower court. 
In that case, among other things, Dan unsuccessfully challenged 
the constitutionality of Utah's divorce laws. This Court held: 
"We reject appellant's contention that the divorce statutes are 
vague and overbroad or violate equal protection guarantees." [A 
copy of that decision is attached as Appendix A-l to Piper's 
Brief]. 
6/5/00 The U. S. Supreme Court decided Troxel v. Granville, supra, 
which among other things, recognized fit parents' 
constitutionally protected right to determine the "care, custody 
and control of their children." Because the Troxel, supra 
decision constituted a change in the law, this Court's 9/25/97 
and 11/4/99 decisions (mentioned above) were, in effect 
overruled, they no longer had res judicata effect and Dan was 
no longer thereby prevented from challenging the 
constitutionality of Utah's divorce laws. [See discussion in 11 , 
P. 1 above]. 
2/15/01 Ut. Ct. App. ignored the Troxel, supra decision and its 
declaration of fit parent's constitutional rights to the "care, 
custody and control of their children", and instead ruled in 
Shinkoskeyv. Shinkoskey, 19P.3d 1005,1007-1008, that "by the 
plain language of the statute, divorce courts have jurisdiction 
over 'children'" and that the power of the judge to be the 
decision-maker over the children is absolute with "no hint of 
limitation." The Shinkoskey, supra, decision ignored the U. S. 
Constitution's federal supremacy clause, and is absolutely 
inconsistent with the Troxel, supra decision. In his declaratory 
judgment action, Dan seeks to resolve this obvious 
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Dan, Troxel, supra, had the effect of overruling this Court's decisions holding that Utah's 
divorce laws to be constitutional, Troxel, supra, is binding on the Utah divorce courts.14 
Judge Medley also erred when in part he held that: [ | 2 of Conclusions of Law, R. 238-243]. 
denial of the Petitions for Certiorari by the Utah Supreme 
Court and the United States Supreme Court are res judicata 
to the issues in this action. (Emphasis added). 
As discussed in \ 1, P. 1, 16, P. 5 and in footnote 9, P. 5 above, denial of a petition for a writ 
of certiorari is not a ruling on the merits and is not res judicata as to the issues addressed in 
those petitions. 
9. Under Federal Supremacy, Troxel, supra, is binding on Utah Divorce Courts. 
Art. IV(2) of the U. S. Constitution makes Federal Law constitutional and statutory laws the 
inconsistency and for this Court to recognize parents5 
constitutionally protected right to determine the "care, custody 
and control of their children." 
5/5/01 Dan filed this action seeking declaratory judgment which, 
among other things, merely asked the Court to apply Troxel, 
supra with respect to Utah's divorce laws by recognizing and 
honoring fit parents' constitutionally protected right to 
determine the "care, custody and control of their children" and 
imposing reasonable constitutional limits on the power of judges 
to override fit parents' decisions concerning their children. 
10/18/01 Ut. Ct. App. decided State ex rel S. A, supra, a "sibling at risk" 
case" in which [37 P.3d 1166,1168, f 12] this Court recognized 
a father's "protected interest" in his child and cited Troxel, 
supra with approval. 
See discussion in § VII, Issue I Res Judicata, P. 41 in Dan's opening brief. 
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supreme law of the land and mandates that all state judges "shall be bound thereby."15 The 
Troxel, supra decision is the supreme law of the land and this Court is bound thereby. 
Without being sanctioned for asserting his constitutional rights, URCP 11(b)(2) specifically 
authorized Dan to make: 
a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modifications or 
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law. 
(Emphasis added). 
Dan's arguments were proper and appropriate. Sanctions were erroneously imposed upon 
him by the trial court. Those sanctions should be vacated. 
10. Denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari is not res judicata. As discussed 
in \ 6 above, denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari has no precedential or res judicata 
effect. Piper's contrary argument and Judge Medley's ruling are simply wrong. 
11. Piper's generalized arguments should be disregarded. Without identifying 
specific items, Piper generally alleges that Dan's brief contains "contradictory or misleading 
statements", that "quotes from cases are taken out of context" and that the cases cited are 
allegedly "clearly distinguishable" [P. 12]. Although it is of little importance in this appeal, 
15
 Art. IV(2) of the U. S. Constitution reads in relevant part as follows: 
(2) This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the judges of every state shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. (Emphasis 
added). 
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Piper argues that the reason given for Dan's attorney's withdrawal [illness] is allegedly 
hearsay [P. 12]. Piper's contraiy claims as to the reason for withdrawal of Dan's attorney are 
also hearsay [P. 6 & 12]. Whatever the reason for the withdrawal, it is undisputed that Dan's 
attorney withdrew on 3/21/02, which was the same day that Piper's attorney mailed her 
URCP 11 motion [P.6]. He withdrew before receipt of Piper's URCP 11 motion. 
IV. REPLY TO SECTION VI AND VII OF PIPER'S RESPONSE 
RESPONSE TO "ARGUMENT" 
12. Dan's response includes cross-references. In the interest of brevity Dan makes 
a joint response to Piper's § VII "Summary of Arguments" and VIII "ARGUMENT". In 
instances where Piper's arguments have been addressed in whole or in part a in prior section 
of this brief, Dan sometimes refers to the page where those matters are discussed. Dan's 
argument is generally in the same order as Piper's arguments in her brief, as follows: 
13. Dan's notice of appeal fully complied with URAP 3(d) and is adequate to 
confer jurisdiction on this Court. Piper makes the curious argument [P. 16] that because 
the Notice of Appeal specifically identified the Order denying Dan's URCP 59(e) Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment, that the issues on appeal are allegedly: (1) limited to the Court's 
denial of that Motion [R. 244-246] and (2) that his appeal does not include the Court's 
10/15/01 Summary Judgment Order [R. 244-245]. To the contrary, as discussed in more 
detail above [P. 1-3], Dan's Notice of Appeal also specifically states that "The appeal is 
taken from the entire judgment." This is the precise wording specified in f^ 2a of URAP 
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"Notice of Appeal/' Form 1, and as a matter of law is sufficient to include the Court's 
10/15/01 Order re summary the judgment motions [R. 238-245]. Dan fully complied with the 
requirements of URAP 3(d), which states that a notice of appeal "shall designate the 
judgment or order, or part thereof appealed from." The terms "entire judgment" is broad 
enough to include the Court's summary judgment order. Piper's argument lacks merit and 
candor. 
Fit parents9 right to control their children 
14. The Troxel, supra decision affirms parents' constitutionally protected right 
to make decisions concerning the "care, custody and control of their children" without 
state interference. See discussion in 15, P. 3-5 above. Contraryto Piper's argument [P. 16-
19], the Troxel, supra decision is not limited to third-party and grandparent visitation rights. 
As noted above [Par 7, P. 5], in State ex rel S. A.,16 this Court has applied Troxel, supra in 
non-third-party proceedings, in litigation involving a "sibling at risk" case. This Court cited 
Troxel, supra concerning the constitutional rights of parents to control their children. Dan 
has a right to have this Court rule as to the constitutional effect on Utah's divorce laws which 
flow from Troxel, supra. 
U.S. Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction re visitation 
15. Troxel, supra, concerns a state's unconstitutional denial of fit parents' 
constitutional right to control their children. Troxel, supra concerns the State of 
16
 State ex rel S.A., 37 P.3d 1166, f 5 (Ut Ct. App. 2001). 
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Washington having denied a fit parent's constitutional right to make decisions concerning 
and right to govern her children. It is not about grandparent visitation rights, although those 
rights were the catalyst which resulted in the appeal. 
16. U. S. Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to decide visitation rights. As stated 
in P. 170 of the Record, the U. S. Supreme Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. Except 
to the extent that a parent's constitutional rights are denied, the U. S. Supreme Court does 
not have jurisdiction to decide state court visitation rights.17 It is barred by federal law from 
"addressing visitation rights of third parties and grandparents." As noted by Piper [P. 19], 
because it lacked jurisdiction to do so, the U. S. Supreme Court did not address custody, 
visitation, support, health insurance, division of property, etc. However, it did properly 
address whether the Washington Statute was repugnant to parents' constitutional rights. In 
Troxel, supra, the U. S. Supreme Court concluded that the state court's granting of visitation 
rights to grandparents violated "perhaps one of the oldest of fundamental liberty interests," 
the parent's constitutional rights regarding the "care, custody and control of their children." 
[Quoted in ^ 7 above]. Piper's argument that the Troxel, supra court "addressed visitation 
rights of third parties and grandparents and did not encompass the Washington divorce 
17 
Art. Ill, § 2 of the U. S. Constitution gives federal courts limited jurisdiction "as the 
Congress shall make." 28 U.S.C. § 1275(a) allows the U. S. Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari for: 
1. Federal law validity. 
2. State statute validity "on the ground of its being repugnant to the 
Constitution." (Emphasis added) 
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statutes" misses the point and is wrong. As discussed above [Par. 15 & 16], the U. S. 
Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to address state court visitation rights. Instead, in Troxel, 
supra, the U. S. Supreme Court addressed fit parent's constitutional right to make decisions 
concerning the "care, custody and control of their children" without state interference. 
Dan's declaratory judgment lawsuit quite properly asked the Court to determine whether fit 
Utah parents constitutional right to make decisions concerning the "care, custody and control 
of their children" without state interference are also constitutionally protected from Utah 
divorce statutes which are repugnant to said parental constitutionally protected rights as 
defined in the Troxel, supra decision. 
Troxel supra, supports Dan's argument 
17. Piper's quotations from Troxel supra, support Dan's but not her arguments. 
Piper quoted extensively from Troxel, supra, in an effort to show that Dan's argument re 
parental constitutional rights to control their children is allegedly frivolous.18 Her quotations 
do not support Piper's argument. Instead, as demonstrated below, the Troxel, supra language 
quoted by Piper supports Dan's arguments regarding fit parents' constitutional rights to 
control the "care, custody and control of their children": 
(a) Language quoted by Piper: [Page 17] 
"Washington's breathtakingly broad statute effectively permits a court to 
disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning visitation 
18
 See single line quotation of about 1 Vi pages from Troxel, supra, at P. 17-18 in 
Piper's Brief. 
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whenever a third party affected by the decision files a visitation petition, based solely 
on the judge's determination of the child's best interest. A parent's estimation of 
the child's best interest is accorded no deference... The problem here is •. . that 
(the Court) gave no special weight to Granville's determination of her daughter's 
best interest. More importantly, that court appears to have applied the opposite 
presumption, favoring grandparent visitation. In affect, it placed on Granville the 
burden of disproving that visitation would be in her daughter's best interest and 
thus failed to provide any protection for her fundamental right. . . . These 
factors, . . . show . . . that the visitation order was an unconstitutional 
infringement on Granville's right to make decisions regarding the rearing of her 
children." (Emphasis added). 
(b) Dan's response: 
Utah Courts should have, but have not, applied Troxel, supra,, as a limitation on 
divorce judges power to override decisions by fit parents concerning their children. As 
discussed in ^ f footnote 13, supra; in f^ 2 and 3 in the "Statement of Facts," P. 17-18 of Dan's 
opening brief, in Shinkoskey, supra, this Court held that "by the plain language of the statute, 
divorce courts have jurisdiction over 'children'" and that the power of the judge to be the 
decision-maker is absolute with "no hint of limitation." Utah's 2/15/02 decision in 
Shinkoskey, supra, unconstitutionally gives the divorce judge almost unlimited power to 
disregard and overrule fit parents' decisions concerning the care, custody and control of their 
children. In the Shinkoskey, supra decision, this Court appears to have ignored the 6/5/00 
U. S. Supreme Court's Troxel, supra decision and parental constitutional rights to control 
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their children as defined therein, to have ignored the fact that this Court is bound by Federal 
Constitutional Law, etc.19 
(c) The broad discretion given to Utah judges to override fit parent's decisions 
is also unconstitutionally breathtakingly broad. Contrary to Piper's argument, the 
Shinkoskey, supra decision does not support her argument. Instead, the language quoted by 
Piper supports Dan's argument that Utah divorce laws are unconstitutional, that his 
arguments were not frivolous, and that URCP 11 sanctions were improperly imposed. Like 
the "breathtakingly broad" Washington grandparent visitation statute involved in Troxel, 
supra, under this Court's Shinkoskey, supra decision Utah divorce judges also have almost 
unlimited ("breathtakingly broad") discretion to overrule decisions by fit parents concerning 
control of their children. 
Denial of petitions for certiorari is not res judicata 
18. Denial of writs of certiorari is not an adjudication on the merits. As 
discussed in f 2, P. 3 above, denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari to either the Utah or 
U. S. Supreme Courts is not an adjudication on the merits, does not have res judicata effect, 
and does not prevent Dan from seeking a ruling as to the constitutional effect on Utah's 
divorce laws which flow from Troxel, supra. But for the later (intervening) U. S. Supreme 
Court decision in the constitutional effect on Utah's divorce laws which flow from Troxel, 
19
 See discussion in f 9 and footnote 15, P. 8-9 above, re the Federal Supremacy 
clause of the U. S. Constitution and its specific binding effect upon state court judges. 
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supra,, Piper's argument that the prior decision of this Court upholding the constitutionality 
of Utah's divorce laws was probably res judicata and Dan's declaratory judgment lawsuit, 
might have been barred. However, as discussed in § VI, f 5, P. 3-5 above, an unresolved 
substantial legal issue remained as to whether the intervening decision in Troxel, supra, had 
the effect of overruling those prior decisions of this court. If so, whether the prior res 
judicata effect of this Court's 11/4/99 decision [App. A-1 to Piper's Brief] continued to exist 
was an open question which allowed Dan a "non-frivolous" right to again challenge to the 
constitutionality of Utah Divorce laws based upon the effect of the later decision in Troxel, 
supra. Because this was a substantial issue of law not yet decided by Utah Appellate Courts, 
Dan's attempt to obtain such a ruling was neither "frivolous" or sanctionable. 
Marshaling of evidence not required 
19. Because of summary judgment evidence Dan need not martial evidence. 
Instead evidence is construed in light most favorable to Dan. Piper makes the curious 
argument that Dan failed to perform his alleged duty to marshal evidence [P. 20]. In support, 
Piper cited Neeley,20 an appeal from a jury verdict, where the appellant had failed to martial 
evidence in support of the jury verdict [P. 20]. Because in the present case a summary 
judgment was involved, there was no trial and no evidence to martial. Instead of a 
presumption of validity of the jury verdict as existed in Neeley, supra, in our case "all 
evidence and all reasonable inference fairly to be drawn therefrom (are to be surveyed by the 
20
 Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002). 
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court) in the light most favorable to him" (Dan).21 In any event, the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law entered concerning the Motion for Summary Judgment22 is a martial of 
evidence which Piper believed supported her claims. Nothing could be accomplished by Dan 
again repeating that summary. 
Dan's URCP 60(b) action was timely 
20. Dan's URCP 60(b) action was timely filed. Piper incorrectly argues that Dan's 
URCP 60(b) Motion was untimely because it was filed approximately 4 years after the 
divorce decree [P. 21]. After this Court's 11/4/99 decision in Case #990666 [App. A-l to 
Piper's brief], held that Utah's divorce laws were not unconstitutional, the principal of res 
judicata barred Dan from again challenge the constitutionality of Utah's divorce laws. It was 
not until the 6/5/00 Troxel, supra decision that Dan could again challenge the 
constitutionality of Utah's divorce laws because res judicata no longer applied if, as argued 
by Dan, the law had changed.23 Dan's declaratory lawsuit was filed 3/5/01, about 8 months 
after the 6/5/00 U.S. Supreme Court's decision which recognized parental constitutional 
rights concerning decisions regarding their children in Troxel, supra. This gave Dan a new 
opportunity to challenge. Dan filed his appeal less than a month after this Court's ruling in 
its 2/15/01 Shinkoskey, supra decision, in which this Court failed to consider the effect of 
21
 Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 259 P.2D 297 (1953); Thompson v. Ford Motor 
Co., 395 P.2d 62 (1964); Brown v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982). 
22
 R. 238-246. 
23
 See discussion in 11 , P. 41 of Dan's opening brief. 
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Troxel, supra, and held that divorce courts have almost absolute discretion to overrule 
decisions made by fit parents concerning their children. Therefore, Dan's declaratory 
judgment lawsuit is not barred by laches as argued by Piper [P. 21]. 
URCP 11 sanctions should be vacated 
21. URCP 11 authorized Dan's declaratory judgment lawsuit, asking the Court 
to rule on constitutional effect on Utah's divorce laws, from the Troxel, supra decision. 
Contrary to Piper's argument [ | 3 & 4, P. 11-12], and as discussed in f 9, P. 9 above, URCP 
11 specifically allowed Dan to seek a declaration from the Court as to the legal effect on 
Utah's divorce laws which flow from Troxel, supra. Piper's argument and Judge Medley's 
ruling that denial of Dan's petitions for writs of certiorari resulted in a res judicata and/or 
issue preclusion are clearly without merit. See discussion in Par. 6 and 10 above. 
22. URCP 11 sanctions may not be imposed because "safe harbor" opportunity 
was not given to Dan. Piper did not comply with the safe harbor provisions in URCP 
11(c)(1)(A), which compliance is a condition precedent to imposition of sanctions.24 Dan's 
declaratory judgment action and supporting arguments were reasonable, plausible issues he 
raised have not been ruled upon by Utah's appellate Courts, and are substantial issues of law 
which should be decided by this Court. URCP 11(b)(2) specifically allowed Dan to attempt 
to clarify the effect Troxel, supra on Utah's divorce laws and/or to change those laws, 
without being subject to sanctions. Imposition of sanctions under these circumstances is 
24
 See discussion in f^ 1 and 2, P. 38-39 in Dan's Opening Brief. 
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against public policy. Among other things, such a ruling would have a chilling effect upon 
the willingness of a party or his attorney to challenge existing law and/or to change or make 
new law. The "safe harbor" provisions in URCP 11 are designed to give an offending party 
a chance to correct his error (if there had been one) and to thereby avoid sanctions. Whether 
or not Dan would have utilized the "safe harbor" provisions is not material. Particularly 
where, as here, Dan was appearing pro se, the opportunity should have been made available 
to him. URCP 11 fs "safe harbor" provisions should be liberally construed to effect its 
remedial purpose. 
23. URCP 11 ?s Safe harbor should be liberally construed. Counsel for Piper 
attempts to excuse his failure to_afford Dan the 20 day "safe harbor" opportunity to withdraw 
his pleadings [P. 27-29]. As a pro se litigant, even more reason existed for allowing Dan an 
opportunity to withdraw the allegedly offensive pleadings. Whether Dan would have agreed 
and withdrawn those pleadings is not material. The bottom line is, that no sanctions may be 
imposed because Dan was not afforded the URCP 11(c)(1)(A) "safe harbor" opportunity. 
24. URCP 11 sanctions may not be imposed for claims asserted in the complaint 
which was drafted while Dan was a "represented party". URCP 11(c)(2)(A) specifically 
prohibits imposition of monetary damages against a "represented party." Dan was a 
"represented party" when the complaint was filed. Accordingly, sanctions cannot properly 
be imposed against Dan for the claims asserted in the complaint. 
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No affidavit required for Dan's URCP 59(e) motion 
25. Dan's URCP 59(e) Motion did not require an affidavit. Piper's argument that 
Dan's URCP 59(e) motion had to be supported by an affidavit is in error. Had there been a 
trial, then as stated in URCP 59(a)(1) [irregularity in the proceedings of the court.. by which 
either party was prevented from having a fair trial] might have required an affidavit. This 
case was decided by summary judgment without a trial. Nothing could have been 
accomplished by filing an affidavit which merely recited that which was already in the 
memoranda supporting the Motion for Summary Judgment, which was already well known 
to Judge Medley, he having ruled on the motion for summary judgment. Piper's argument 
re URCP 59(a)(4) is without merit. Dan's Motion was not based on newly discovered 
evidence as contemplated thereby. Dan's good faith argument concerning gender bias 
against fathers, denial of due process, etc. reflect his genuine belief His free speech 
arguments with respect thereto were appropriate and not sanctionable. 
Dan's declaratory judgment claims were not Res judicata 
26. URCP 11 sanctions against Dan should be vacated. Contrary to Piper's 
argument [P. 22-24], Dan's right to again challenge the constitutionality of Utah's Divorce 
Laws was no longer barred by Res judicata after the Troxel, supra decision. For the reasons 
discussed above25 after the Troxel, supra decision, what effect the Troxel, supra decision had 
on Utah's divorce laws was an undecided legal issue which was not barred byRes judicata. 
25
 For the sake of brevity, said arguments are not repeated here. They may be found in 
discussion in If 5-10 and 14-18 above. 
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Dan had a legal right to litigate that issue without being subject to sanctions. Dan's attempt 
to clarify the effect Troxel, supra on Utah's divorce laws and/or to change those laws 
specifically allowed under URCP 11(b)(2), et seq., were proper and do not subject him to 
URCP 11 sanctions. The URCP 11 sanctions imposed on Dan by Judge Medley should be 
vacated. Also see discussion in f 21-24 above. 
27. Dan's URCP 59(e) Motion was proper. Denial of Dan's URCP 59(e) motion 
was in error for the same reasons that the Court's granting of summary judgment dismissing 
Dan's declaratory judgment lawsuit was error. The Court should have corrected its error by 
granting Dan's URCP 59(e) motion. See discussion in \ 3-10, 14-17,18, 21-25 above. 
Piper's generalized and usupported statements such as Dan's "reliance on Troxel was 
misplaced and frivolous" and that "quotes from cases cited are taken out of context [P. 27] 
are insufficient and should be disregarded. Piper's argument that the Court allowed 
sufficient time for the hearing misses the point. [P. 25]. Almost Vi hour of the allotted time 
remained, however the Court cut Dan off and did not permit him to fully develop his 
argument or his theory of the case. See discussion on P. 30-36 of Dan's opening brief. 
28. Dan's rights under CJA 4-506 were denied. Whether CJA 4-506 is labeled as 
"procedural" or "jurisdictional," Dan was entitled to be afforded the benefit of the "safe 
harbor" provisions in URCP 11(b)(2) before sanctions were imposed. Speculation as to 
whether he might have taken advantage of those provisions is not material. The bottom line 
is that he because he was not afforded the "safe harbor" rights specified therein. Therefore, 
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sanctions should not have been imposed and they should be vacated. See discussion in 122 
above. The "safe harbor" provisions in URCP 11 should be liberally construed to effect their 
remedial purpose. See discussion in 123 above. Imposition of sanctions for claims asserted 
in the complaint are prohibited by URCP 11(c)(2)(A) because the complaint was drafted by 
an attorney at a time when Dan was a "represented person" within the meaning of that rule. 
See discussion in 124 above. The dispute over reasons for withdrawal by Dan's attorney are 
immaterial and Piper's claims with respect thereto are hearsay. See discussion in f 11 above. 
Attorney fee award should be vacated 
29. Award of attorney fees is not authorized. Piper cites the Marshall case26 at P. 
517 in support of her claim that she is entitled to be awarded attorney fees in connection with 
both the proceedings in the trial Court and in connection with this appeal [P. 16, Par. 7]. 
Marshall supra, was a divorce case where attorney fees were authorized by statute and were 
awarded pursuant to UC § 30-3-3 (1995). This is a suit for declaratory judgment, not a 
divorce action, so the award of fees pursuant to the divorce statute is not authorized. Piper's 
claim for attorney fees either at the trial level or on appeal should be denied. 
V. CONCLUSION & RELIEF 
For the reasons discussed above and in the opening brief, Dan respectfully requests 
that this court grant the relief requested on P. 43-44 of the opening Brief summarized below 
as follows: 
26
 Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2D 508, 517 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). 
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(1) The summary judgment dismissing Dan's declaratory judgment lawsuit should 
be reversed; 
(2) A ruling that the U. S. Supreme Court's decision in Troxel, supra rendered Utah's 
divorce laws unconstitutional, particularly as they were construed by this Court in its 
Shinkoskey, supra decision; 
(3) A review of the decision regarding the effect Troxel supra decision has on Utah's 
divorce laws, particularly with respect to the right of fit parents to make decisions concerning 
their children and as to limitations on the divorce judge's right to overrule those decisions; 
(4) URCP 11 sanctions should be vacated for the reasons stated above, including: 
(a) a genuine unresolved dispute existed as to whether Troxel, supra overruled this Court's 
11/4/99 decision in Case No. 990666 [App. A-l to Piper's brief] (b) whether the Troxel, 
supra decision removed the Res judicata bar to further challenges to the constitutionality of 
Utah's divorce laws so as to allow Dan to seek a ruling as to the effect of the Res judicata 
decision, if any, on the constitutionality of Utah's divorce laws; (c) whether URCP 11(b)(2) 
allowed Dan to make his argument for the "extension, modification or reversal of existing 
law or the establishment of new law" without the chilling effect of URCP 11 sanctions for 
doing so; (d) whether Dan is insulated from sanctions by URCP 11 (c)(2)(A), which precludes 
imposition of sanctions on a "represented party" for "a violation of subdivision (b)(2), since 
he was a "represented party" at the time that his complaint was filed, and (e) because of the 
chilling effect on litigants efforts to challenge or expand existing laws; and, 
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(5) Attorney fees awarded to Piper should be vacated because the divorce statute 
relied upon by Piper is not applicable in this non-divorce case,27 and because award of 
attorney fees is not authorized by the declaratory judgment statute. If the judgment is 
reversed, then as a non-prevailing party Piper is not entitled to recover attorney fees. If fees 
are awarded they should be awarded in Dan's favor. 
Dated January 2, 2003. 
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